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Abstract 
Security is critical for wireless sensor networks 
(WSN)deployed in hostile environments since many 
types of attacks could reduce the trust on the global 
functioning of any WSN. Many solutions have been 
proposed to secure communications for WSNs and 
most of them rely on a centralized component which 
behaves as a certificate authority. We propose in this 
paper a distributed solution able to ensure authen-
tication of nodes at any time without having any 
on-line access to a certificate authority. Each node 
will be equipped with a Trusted Platform Module 
(TPM) which is able to store keys with security. Each 
node will have its own public key and private key 
pair in the TPM and a certificate of the public key. 
The certificate is issued off-line when setting-up the 
node. When a node communicates with another, it 
has to sign the message with its own private key 
(done securely by the TPM) and sends the message, 
the signature and the certificate of the public key. 
The evaluation of the solution has been done using 
simulation and the overhead added by integrating 
authentication does not exceed 15% of energy con-
sumption. 
Index Terms—WSN, Security, TPM, authentication. 
I. Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks are based on a com-
bination of sensing function with computing and 
communication which opens the possibility to many 
applications to be developed in many areas. Securing 
wireless sensor networks, is particularly challenging 
since many constraints exist: 
• Reduced memory resources: we do not have 
enough space to store data about all nodes. 
• Their ad-hoc nature, potentially forcing sensor 
nodes to interact with many different networks 
over time. 
• Sensor nodes are not tamper resistant, therefore 
any secrete key or code could be extracted easily. 
• The use of PKI is not possible since a connection 
to the internet (and to an certificate authority) is 
not possible. 
Wireless sensor nodes have to work using their 
limited energy capacity for sensing, computing and 
transmitting information in a wireless environment 
since recharging or replacing batteries is not always 
possible. 
Security is critical for sensor networks deployed 
in hostile environments. Indeed, it is well known that 
wireless communication is subjected to threats such 
as flooding attack, denial of service attack jamming 
attack, selective forwarding attack. For these rea-
sons, ensuring node authentication protects commu-
nications against these attacks. Security mechanisms 
deployed in WSNs should involve collaboration be-
tween all the nodes due to the decentralized nature 
of the nodes and the absence of any infrastructure. 
In addition, it is much critical when the nodes are 
equipped with security items as secrete keys and 
any other sensitive data. Intruders may deploy among 
nodes some fake nodes similar to the actual nodes. 
We propose in this paper an authentication method 
of transmitting data and a secure method to store 
sensitive data in a WSN thanks to a Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM). A TPM is used to ensure a secure 
storing of all required data to authenticate the nodes. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II is 
dedicated to related works. Section III details our 
security model. Section IV explains the model is 
implemented. Finally, section V gives a conclusion 
and some hints about future works. 
II. Related works 
Resources are very limited on WSNs nodes. For 
this main reason, all research studies on WSN have 
to consider carefully this issue. Indeed, if we intend 
to integrate security in a WSN, we should take care 
of this issue. Many research studies have proposed 
adapted security solutions for WSNs. In [1], an 
interesting survey is proposed about some security 
solutions on WSNs done before 2009. In [2], the 
concept is a TPM is presented with its architecture 
and all required components. [3] and [4] proposed 
a secure techniques on data aggregation, they focus 
on achieving the aggregation in a secure manner In 
[5] and [6], authors have proposed security solutions 
based on TPM. In [7], an authentication mechanism 
is proposed over WSN where nodes are equipped 
with TPM. But in this study, a certificate authority 
is implemented on a specific sensor. 
III. The model 
A . Basic cryptography framework 
Public-key algorithms are mainly based on mathe-
matical problems which are difficult to solve. Indeed, 
they consider some fundamental issues as integer 
factorization, discrete logarithm, and in some other 
cases elliptic curve relationships. 
It is quite obvious that it is computationally easy 
for a user to generate a public and private key-pair. 
These keys could be used to ensure confidentiality 
or authentication. But is is well known that it is 
computationally very hard or impossible to generate 
a private key from its corresponding public key. Mes-
sage confidentiality necessitate to encrypt a message 
with the public key and a decryption with the private 
one. Message authentication involves processing a 
message with a private key to produce a digital 
signature. Then any receiver can verify this signature 
by processing the signature value with the signer’s 
corresponding public key and comparing that result 
with the received message. If this signatures matches 
then the message is authenticated. 
Public-key algorithms are fundamental ingredients 
in security applications and protocols. Some pub-
lic key algorithms provide distribution of keys for 
example Diffie"Hellman key exchange, some other 
algorithms provide digital signatures as DSA (Digital 
Signature Algorithm), and sometimes some others 
provide both as RSA. 
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is a public-
key crypto-system similar to RSA, or El Gamal 
Algorithm. An elliptic curve is a plane figure defined 
by an equation having a shape like 2 = 3 + + . 
The F(x, y)=0 (with 2 variables) gives a curve in the 
plane. We use geometric arithmetic methods to find 
the equation solutions. 
Elliptic curves are used as an extension to other 
current crypto-systems like Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman Key exchange (ECDHK), Elliptic Curve 
Digital Signature algorithm (ECDSA). The use of 
such algorithms, participants should agree on some 
publicly-known data items like the elliptic curve 
equation, the values of a and b, prime p. 
Then, an elliptic group (computed from the elliptic 
curve equation) is generated. A base point B, taken 
from the elliptic group Similar to the generator used 
in current crypto systems. Each user generates its 
public/private key pair where private key is an integer, 
x, selected from the interval [1, p-1] and the Public 
Key = product, Q, of private key and base point (Q = 
x*B). Elliptic curve cryptography is much faster and 
requires less memory therefore it is really suitable for 
WSN. For this reason, our proposed method is based 
a on ECDSA mechanism. 
B. Trusted Platform Module 
In our model for sensors will use mechanisms 
offered by a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). We 
consider that each node of the WSN is equipped with 
a TPM. 
A TPM is an implementation of a standard de-
veloped by the Trusted Computing Group [8]. This 
module is designed to support various procedures and 
protocols that can be used for securing data. Mainly, 
the following functions are usually provided: 
generating an asymmetric key pair 
secure storage of keys, 
generating an electronic signatures, 
encryption and decryption, 
C. Init ial ization step 
Each node should have its own public and 
private key pair We consider in our proposal 
that a certificate authority (CA) works off-line for 
one main purpose: it will sign the public key 
of each node. Thereafter it will issue a certificate 
to each node. This operation is done once when a 
sensor is built. That means each node will have its 
own certificate and the CA public key stored securely. 
D. Authenticated communication step 
Our main contribution is proposed in this part. 
Indeed, if a node needs to send a message 
to another node , will compute a signature of 
this message thru its private key and will produce 
( ). Then will send the message M, its sig-
nature ( ) and its own certificate . When 
receives the message with the signature
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and a certificate , it will first extract public 
key from . It will then extract the sent 
signature from which is compared the calculated 
signature on the received message. If both signatures 
are equal, then the message is authenticated. This 
process could be optimized in the sense that a node 
can send messages with their signatures and some-
times they insert the node certificate. The receiving 
node will keep this signed messages until they receive 
the certificate. At that moment, all recorded signed 
messages will be verified thanks to the certificate. 
This optimization could only be applied for non-real 
time applications. 
IV. Evaluation of the model 
In this section, we will detail the evaluation of our 
contribution through simulations 
A . Simulator environment 
The scenario has been implemented in Castalia 
simulator. The decision about the simulator is made 
following these reasons: 
Castalia simulator is focused on WSN. That 
means, Castalia includes several necessary fea-
tures for our scenario. 
Castalia simulator is based on OMNET++. OM-
NET++ [9] proposes a modular library which 
could be used to develop network simulators. 
This simulator can support MAC protocols as 
well as some protocols used in WSN. In addi-
tion, OMNET++ has a mobility framework, and 
can monitor power consumption. 
Castalia physical layer and radio models are 
one of the most realistic models among the 
WSN simulators. Castalia offers multiple char-
acteristics as path loss, mobility in the nodes, 
interference models, multiple modulations and 
node sleep states. 
Castalia includes some typical radio inter-
faces for WSNs, such as CC1010, CC2420 or 
CC2430, but it also accepts the implementation 
of new ones. 
According to the OMNET++, Castalia uses 
modules and messages to implement a WSN. 
Castalia nodes connect to each other through 
the wireless channel module which is respon-
sible for delivering the messages. In addition, a 
physical process module implements the events 
simulation that occurs in the scenario. 
The node is a composite module. Each node 
contains a communication module (radio, MAC 
and routing layers) connected to the wireless 
module. The application layer is plugged on 
the communication module . Finally, each node 
has a resource manager that gathers information 
about the memory, energy, CPU consumption 
from every module in the node. 
B. Scenario description 
The simulated scenario is composed of 21 WSN 
nodes deployed in a 50 m x 50 m area. The nodes 
communicate over a star topology including 1 net-
work coordinator and 20 end-devices (environment 
monitoring sensors). The coordinator position is fixed 
in the center of area, while the end-devices are ran-
domly deployed following a uniform distribution. The 
simulated scenario uses the standard IEEE 802.15.4 
over the 2.4 GHz ISM band. 
For the simulation scenario, typical WSN packets 
are chosen. End-devices transmit WSN packets to the 
network coordinator of 4, 20 and 100 Bytes length at 
-5 dBm. Different data rates are simulated in order 
to evaluate their influence on the results. Different 
packet rates see selected from 1 to 20 packet/s for 
the different messages sizes. 
WSN nodes are modeled by a Texas Instrument 
CC2420 transceiver commonly used for WSNs. A 
maximum number of 5 retransmissions are selected 
for the WSN nodes. The values of energy consump-
tion are extracted from the CC2420 datasheet (for 
transmission, reception, idle modes and energy costs 
of transitions between modes) and verified through 
experimentation in a real testbed. Typical current con-
sumptions of WSN nodes are 20 mA in transmission 
or reception mode and below 1 mA in a stand-by 
mode. 
The use of the TPM and the certification described 
in the paper is introduced into the simulator by their 
cost in terms in energy consumption and the increase 
in packet length. As described in the datasheet, en-
ergy consumption at the TPM module is assumed 25 
mA in active mode and 0.9 mA in idle mode. The 
signature is assumed as 28 bytes and the certificate 
is modeled as 64+28 bytes. 
Different levels of authentication have been simu-
lated in order to extract conclusions about the over-
head introduced by the use of the TPM module and 
the authentication mechanism described below. Also, 
a basic scenario without authentication protocol is 
simulated for comparison purposes. All the results 
presented in this work show the energy consumption 
(in Joules) per second for the whole network of 20 
nodes. 
C. Energy consumption evaluation 
In this section, we will show the results of our 
evaluation. We have undertaken various simulation 
situations. We have conducted some simulations with 
full authentication, that means each message will be 
sent with its own signature and its certificate. Some 
others have been achivied with 1 certificate sent for 5 
messages sent. Some other situations we will not use 
authentication when we mention no-authentication. 
On the figures, we observe in all cases that there is an 
overhead due to authentication. It could be measured 
as 15% maximum in worst cases. 
Figure 1. Energy consumed with various au-
thenticated messages where message size is 
4bytes 
Figure 2. Energy consumed with various au-
thenticated messages where message size is 
20bytes 
In the three figures Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 
3, we observe that the energy consumed with authen-
tication and without authentication differ with few 
joules. The main conclusion is that such a mechanism 
is simple to implement and does not consume high 
energy. In Figure 4, we summarize our results for 
various data rates. We observe that when the data rate 
increases, the influence of the authentication on the 
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Figure 3. Energy consumed with various au-
thenticated messages where message size is 
100bytes 
Figure 4. The overhead rate of energy when 
authentication is added 
energy consumption is quite low. This is explained 
by the fact that with higher data rates, retransmission 
rate may be higher and the added consumed energy 
due to authentication is neglected compared to the 
consumed energy without authentication. 
V. Conclusion & Future Works 
We have proposed a simple and very realistic 
method able to authenticate nodes over a WSN. The 
method is robust since the nodes are equipped with 
a Trusted Plateform Module which will store with 
high security all keys. Each node is also certified 
by an off-line adhoc certificate authority (CA). Then 
each node will have its own public and private keys 
and a certificate from CA. When a node needs to 
authenticate its sent message, it has to send the 
message, a signature produced by the TPM and its 
own certificate. The receiver will be able to check 
the signature of the message since it is able to extract 
the sender’s public key from the received certificate. 
Thereafter it will be able to verify the message’s 
signature. The method is easy to implement and 
the obtained results seems very interesting. Indeed, 
integrating security does not cost as much as we 
could expect. The consumed energy does not exceed 
15%. As a future work, we intend to study large 
scale WSN and check the generated overhead. Some 
optimizations could be investigated as reducing the 
certificate to send. They only could be sent when 
they are required. 
References 
[1] J. Sen, "A Survey on Wireless Sensor Network Security", 
International Journal of Communication Networks and In-
formation Security, Vol. 1, No. 2, August 2009. 
[2] S. Kinney, "Trusted platform module basics: using TPM in 
embedded systems", Embedded Technology Series, Elsevier 
Inc., 2006 
[3] Y Mohamedd Yussoff, H. Hashim, M. Dani Baba, "Identity-
based Trusted Authentication in Wireless Sensor Network", 
International Journal of Computer Science Issues, Vol. 9, 
Issue 3, No 2, May 2012. 
[4] B. Przydatek, D. Song, and A. Perrig, "SIA: Secure Infor-
mation Aggregation in Sensor Networks," Proc. 1st Int’l. 
Conf. Embedded Networked Sensor Systems, SenSys ’03, 
New York: ACM Press, 2003, pp. 255-265, 
[5] W. Hu, H. Tan, P. Corke, W. Chan Shih, S. Jha, "Toward 
Trusted Wireless Sensor Networks", ACM Transactions on 
Sensor Networks, Vol. 7, No. 1, Article 5, August 2010. 
[6] C. KrauSS, F. Stumpf, C. Eckert, "Detecting Node Compro-
mise in Hybrid Wireless Sensor Networks Using Attestation 
Techniques", Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 
4572, Springer 2007, pp. 203-217. 
[7] Janusz Furtak and Jan Chudzikiewicz "Securing transmis-
sions between nodes of WSN using TPM" the Federated 
Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems, 
Lodz, Poland, September 2015, pp. 1071?1080 
[8] TPM Main Part 1 Design Principles. Specification Version 
1.2.Revision 116, Trusted Computing Group, Incorporated, 
2011 
[9] Xian, X.; Shi, W.; Huang, H. "Comparison of OMNET++ 
and other simulator for WSN simulation". 3rd IEEE Con-
ference on Industrial Electronics and Applications, 2008. 
ICIEA 2008. , 2008, pp. 1439 ?1443. 
